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Abstract 
According to the so-called Exclusion Principle (introduced by Baye et alii, 
1993), it might be profitable for the seller to reduce the number of fully-
informed potential bidders in an all-pay auction. We show that it does not apply 
if the seller regards the bidders’ private valuations as belonging to the class of 
identical and independent distributions with a monotonic hazard rate. 
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1. Introduction 
Baye et alii (1993) demonstrate the following somewhat surprising result, the so-called Exclusion 
Principle. In an all-pay auction with complete information it might be in the best interest of the 
seller, if she is able to, to exclude some potential bidders from the short list of the auction 
participants. And in this case she should exclude those with the largest private valuations 
(“willingness to pay”) for the (unique) object to be sold. The result can be applied to several social 
games, such as patent races and sports, and notably to lobbying games: see e.g. Hillman and Riley 
(1989).1 It is due to the fact that the revenue expected (the bidding equilibrium is in mixed 
strategies) by the seller is decreasing in the largest valuation among bidders, call it v1, while 
increasing with respect to the second-largest valuation, v2 (the other bidders bid zero with 
probability 1). Excluding the “strongest” bidders induces (some of) the “weakest” ones to bid more 
and may increase the overall expenditure. In particular, it turns out that the expected total payment 
to the seller is p(v1, v2) = v2/2 + (v2/v1)(v2/2) < v2, where the latter amounts are the expected 
payments of bidders 1 and 2 (those with the largest and the second largest valuations)2 respectively. 
The object is assigned to bidders 1 and 2 respectively with probabilities 1 - v2/v1 and v2/v1, and the 
former bidder expects v1 - v2 in the equilibrium (all the other bidders expect zero). The overall 
expected welfare is then w(v1, v2) = p(v1, v2) + v1 - v2 < v1 (where w > v2), and thus the outcome does 
not belong to the Core of the corresponding exchange game. 
As indicated above, the quoted literature refers to the case of complete information,3 which is 
a somewhat unusual assumption in auction theory. Moreover, the role and the information available 
to the designer (if any) of the auction are somehow left unexplained. In a companion paper 
(Bertoletti, 2005), we argue for example that the Exclusion Principle is affected by the implicit 
assumption that the auction “reserve price” is null.4 Indeed, as far as the lobbying models are 
concerned, the only consistent justification for the adopted setting seems to be that the politician 
(the seller) who receives the lobbies' (bidders’) contributions has very little bargaining power. 
However, the assumption that a fully informed seller can credibly exclude some bidder from her 
short list while she is unable to ask him a price not higher than his valuation does not appear 
generally palatable as a bargaining feature. More robust results should then be based on the explicit 
                                                
1
 Che and Gale (1998) show a somehow related result, namely that the imposition of an exogenous cap on individual 
lobbying contributions may have the adverse effect of increasing total expenditure. 
2
 The possibility of ties in the valuations is ignored here, since we assume that the valuations are ex ante continuously 
distributed (ties may imply the existence of multiple Nash equilibria which are not necessarily revenue equivalent: see 
Baye et alii, 1996). 
3
 Hillman and Riley (1989: pp. 29-30) also deal with the case of incomplete information among contenders, and Che 
and Gale (1998: p. 648) claim that their result would hold even under incomplete information if there were asymmetry 
among bidders. 
4
 In addition, there might also be other, possibly more efficient, ways to motivate the less favourite contenders (for 
example offering, if possible, multiple (divided) prizes: see Moldovanu and Sela, 2001). 
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assumption that the seller does not know the bidders’ preferences. 
Indeed, Menicucci (2005) strikingly shows that for some information structures the Exclusion 
Principle also applies to the case in which the seller regards the bidders’ private valuations as 
identically and independently distributed (iid) and uses no reserve price. Namely, for the 
distributional structures that he considers, excluding from the all-pay auction with complete 
information among the bidders all but two of them (randomly selected) increases the seller’s 
revenue. Menicucci’s example uses a discrete distribution with “small” (the seller is almost certain 
about the bidders’ valuations) uncertainty: however, his distribution can be easily made continuous. 
This then raises the obvious question of what distributional properties do sustain the Exclusion 
Principle in the indicated setting. 
Notice that the Exclusion Principle is at odds with the positive value to the seller of additional 
symmetric (risk-neutral) bidders in private-value auctions with incomplete information: see e.g. 
Krishna (2002: chapter 2). In this note we show that actually it does not apply to the class of iid 
(continuous) distributions with a monotonic hazard rate. In particular, and somewhat more 
generally, we show that for the Exclusion Principle to apply the common distribution of valuations 
must be such that its so-called “mean residual life” (see e.g. Shaked and Shanthikumar, 1994: 
section 1.D) is somewhere increasing. 
 
2. The setting and the result 
Consider the following setting: m (risk-neutral) agents will possibly bid for a unique prize in 
an all-pay auction (there is no resale possibility). Bidder i's valuation of the prize is vi (i = 1, 2, …, 
m) and is ad interim (before bidding takes place) common knowledge among bidders, and we order 
them in such a way that v1 > v2 >…> vm-1 > vm > 0. The seller only knows that ex ante each 
valuation v is iid according to a common, strictly increasing and atomless, continuous cumulative 
distribution function H(v) with support [v, v ], v ≥ 0.5 From her point of view, then, the revenue she 
expects ex ante by (randomly) selecting n bidders (2 ≤ n ≤ m) to participate in the auction is given 
by E{p(v1, v2)}, where v1 and v2 are respectively the first (highest) and the second (second-highest) 
order statistics of n independent draws from H(·) (see e.g. Krishna, 2002: Appendix C). The 
following Proposition holds. 
Proposition 1 Consider an all-pay auction with complete information among bidders (no reserve 
price, no resale possibility). Suppose that the bidders’ valuations are ex-ante identically and 
                                                
5
 These are, of course, the assumptions of the well-known Revenue Equivalence Theorem: see e.g. Klemperer (2004: p. 
17). 
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independently distributed according to a strictly increasing, atomless continuous distribution H(·) 
with a monotonic hazard rate. In this case the seller maximizes her expected revenue by getting the 
largest possible set of actual participants. 
The proof of Proposition 1 is presented in the Appendix. It depends on the fact that, with iid 
valuations, the conditional distribution of v1 given v2, c(v1|v2), is just the distribution of v conditional 
on v ≥ v2, i.e., c(v1|v2) = h(v1)/(1 – H(v2)) (where h(·) is the density function which corresponds to 
H(·)). We are then able to prove, by exploiting the convexity of p(⋅), that the conditional expectation 
21 vv
E {p(v1, v2)}} is increasing with respect to v2 if the hazard rate of H(⋅), λ(⋅) = h(⋅)/(1 – H(⋅)), is 
monotonic. But since an increases in the number of symmetric participants to the auction first-order 
stochastically increases the distribution of v2, it follows that it also raises E{p(v1, v2)} = 
2v
E {
21 vv
E {p(v1, v2)}}. 
 
3. Conclusion 
The intuition for the previous result is provided by the sign of the following derivative:6 
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The expected value of the difference of the first and the second order statistics of the participants’ 
valuations would change with the number of bidders according to the sign of (1) if this were 
constant. Moreover, a somewhere positive value for (1) is a necessary condition for the Exclusion 
Principle to apply to an ex-ante symmetric all-pay auction with complete information. That is, the 
addition of another identical bidder cannot decrease the seller’s expected revenue if 
21 vv
E {v1 - v2} 
(i.e., if the “mean residual life” of v) is nowhere increasing. Since E{v1 - v2} = 1vE {1/λ(v1)}, and it 
is well-known that H1n first-order stochastically dominates H1n-1 (where H1n(⋅) is the (unconditional) 
distribution function of v1 in the case of n independent draws from H(⋅)), if the hazard rate is 
monotonic the addition of another bidder does decrease E{v1 - v2} and raises the seller’s expected 
revenue. 
                                                
6
 Note that, up to the second term of its Taylor expansion with respect to v1 at the right of v2, p ≈ v2 – (v1 - v2)/2. 
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Note that the expected welfare is given by E{w(v1, v2)} = E{p(v1, v2)} + E{v1 - v2}. So any 
bidder exclusion profitable for the seller would then raise the expected welfare by a trivial revealed-
preference argument if it were also to increase E{v1 - v2}. But this can never be the case if the 
hazard rate is monotonic, and the impact on the expected welfare of increasing the number of 
bidders’ set remains ambiguous even in such a case. However, it is easy to see that a sufficient 
condition for an expected welfare improvement to follow any bidder addition under a monotonic 
hazard rate is vh(v) > 1 (E{w(v1, v2)} increases with respect to the number of bidders if 
21 vv
E {0,5(1 
+ λ(v2)/λ(v1)) – 1/(v2λ(v1))} ≥ 0 for any v2). Perhaps interestingly, under the same assumptions no 
bidder exclusion (which always decreases expected welfare) through a positive reserve price would 
be optimal for the seller in a “standard” (see Klemperer, 2004: section 1.1.2) auction with 
incomplete information. More generally, the hazard rate of H(·) plays a role in the characterization 
of the optimal mechanism under incomplete information, because its monotonicity implies that the 
so-called “virtual valuation” v – 1/λ(v) is an increasing function: see e.g. Krishna (2002: chapter 5). 
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Appendix 
Proof of Proposition 1. Since the density function of the joint distribution of the first and second 
order statistics (see e.g. Krishna, 2002: p. 267) is given by: 
 )()()())()((),( 1),(2122221 2 vIvhvhvHnnvvg vn ∞−−=  (A.1) 
(where I(⋅)(·) is the appropriate indicator function), the density function of v1 conditional on v2 is 
given by: 
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on the support [v2, v ] (note that it does not depend on n). Now compute the derivative of: 
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with respect to v2: 
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Then, by noting that p(⋅) is a convex function: 
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Thus 
21 vv
E {p(v1, v2)} is an increasing function of v2 if the hazard rate is monotonic. Finally, recall 
that the (unconditional) distribution function of v2, given n symmetric participants to the auction, is: 
 
nnn vHnvHnvH ))()(1())(()( 21222 −−= − . (A.6) 
Since 
 0))(())((2))(()()( 1221221222 ≥+−=− +−+ nnnnn vHnvHnvHnvHvH , (A.7) 
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it follows that H2n first-order stochastically dominates H2n-1, and thus that any exclusion from the set 
of the potential bidders (strictly) decreases the expected revenue of the seller if the hazard rate of 
H(⋅) is monotonic. QED 
